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ABSTRACT 
While favoring relatively more flexible regimes, emerging economies in East Asia 
and elsewhere appear to heavily manage their currencies despite being officially 
described as “floaters”. In other words, revealed preferences of regional monetary 
authorities appear to indicate a high degree of “fear of floating”. The paper first 
explores the reasons for this fear of floating. It then goes on to examine the case for 
and operational mechanics behind an open inflation targeting regime which has 
increasingly been advocated for small and open economies in East Asia and 
elsewhere. The paper also attempts a reconciliation between the discussion of 
analytics behind open economy inflation targeting and its implications for exchange 
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An immediate lesson that many observers appear to have drawn from 
recent financial crises in emerging market economies in the 1990s is that the 
only viable exchange rate option boils down to one between flexibility, on the 
one hand, and “credible pegging”, on the other. According to this view, 
emerging economies have to gravitate to these two extremes. Any currency 
arrangements that lie in between these polar extremes or corners (i.e. those 
in the “middle”) are viewed as being inherently unstable and crisis-prone. The 
following observation by Eichengreen (2001a) typifies the mainstream view 
with regard to the supposed “hollowing out of the middle”:  
high capital mobility has made it exceedingly difficult…to 
operate pegged-but-adjustable exchange rates…Intermediate 
regimes are fragile. Operating them is tantamount to painting a 
bull’s eye on the forehead of the central bank governor and 
telling speculators “shoot here” (p.267). 
 
A number of observers have strongly favored the corner - as opposed 
to an interior - solution of an irrevocably fixed regime. Such hard pegging or 
straitjacketing of the exchange rate is supposed to signal greater commitment 
to rule out arbitrary exchange rate adjustments (i.e. “escape clauses” cannot 
be invoked) and the willingness of the monetary authority to subordinate 
domestic policy objectives such as output and employment growth to the 
maintenance of the currency peg.  
But how can an exchange rate peg be made credible? Only by making 
it almost unshiftable, i.e. a “hard peg” or “super fix”. This might be done by 
maintaining one’s national currency but creating a rigid commitment to 
permanently fixed or hard rates through institutional arrangements such as a 
Currency Board Arrangement, or by effectively abandoning the domestic  6
currency altogether by using domestically the currency of another country 
(dollarization or eurorization).  
The political unpalatability of dollarization or euroization along with its 
significant policy constrictions - which inflict a currency board arrangement as 
well (see Rajan, 2002a and 2003 and Eichengreen, 2001a) - seems 
effectively to leave only a common regional currency as a practicable 
alternative. But is it? Eichengreen (1994, pp.4-7) appears to think so. He has 
predicted that, in the future, capital mobility will leave countries with one of 
two choices -- a super fix involving monetary union or the other corner of a 
floating regime. Von Furstenberg (2000, pp.199-200) argues more specifically 
that monetary unions are “inevitable..the wave of the future”. 
However, on examining the prospects on monetary unions in East Asia 
and elsewhere, Cohen (2002) reaches the following conclusion:  
While there is reason to believe that some groups of countries 
will move modestly to pool a degree of their monetary 
sovereignty, predictions of many full new monetary unions 
around the globe, on the model of Europe’s EMU, appear 
premature at best. The difficulty of defending uncompetitive 
national currencies may be growing, but for most governments 
the disadvantages of monetary union continue to look more 
formidable still. Few countries share enough group loyalty to 
make the requisite sacrifice of monetary sovereignty seem 
acceptable; and even for those that might be prepared to make 
the commitment, willing partners are hard to find. The world’s 
monetary map will include a growing number of limited alliances 
but few, if any, new joint currencies like the euro. The wave of 
the future will turn out to be little more than a ripple (p.19)
1. 
 
While a monetary union in East Asia remains a serious longer-term 
proposition, its infeasibility over the short and medium terms, along with the 
well-documented limitations of other forms of super fixes, appears to leave a 
flexible regime as the only viable policy option for East Asia.   7
A priori, there are a number of reasons that underlie a preference for a 
greater degree of exchange rate flexibility.  
First, the more flexible the exchange rate regime, the keener the 
incentives for agents to undertake appropriate foreign exchange (forex) risk 
management techniques in response to the higher element of exchange rate 
risk, while simultaneously reducing the extent of moral hazard which could 
lead to “excessive” unhedged external borrowing (referred to as a  “fixed 
exchange rate bubble”). The introduction of these transactions costs and 
exchange rate risks may also help moderate the extent of capital inflows, 
consequently dampening the intensity of boom and bust cycles (this is 
essentially a moral hazard argument). 
Second, small and open economies are far more susceptible to large 
external shocks, such as changes in foreign interest rates, terms of trade, 
regional contagion effects and the like. Received theory tells us that a greater 
degree of exchange rate flexibility is called for in the presence of external or 
domestic real shocks. By acting as a safety valve, flexible exchange regimes 
provide a less costly adjustment mechanism by which relative prices can be 
altered in response to such shocks as opposed to fixed rate regimes. The 
latter relies on gradual reductions in relative costs through deflation and 
productivity increases vis-à-vis trade partners to restore internal balance. This 
can prove to be prolonged and costly, as the Argentine example illustrates 
(Rajan, 2002). Hong Kong, which continues to operate a currency board, has 
been faced with similar, albeit less intense, deflationary pressures since 1998 
                                                                                                                                            
1 Also see Kenen (2000).  8
with ever more frequent calls for it to forsake its US dollar peg (Liu, 2002 and 
Rajan and Siregar, 2002)
2.  
Third, many small economies have diversified trade structures 
(dependent on the US, Japan, Europe and intra-Asian trade). Optimum 
Currency Area (OCA) criteria suggest that such economies are good 
candidates to maintain more flexible regimes. Thus, in the case of East Asia, 
institutionalization of the pre-crisis dollar pegs (via a currency boards or 
dollarization) would not have helped domestic economic performance in 1996-
97 (just prior to the crisis) to the extent that the problem was, at least partly, 
one of loss of competitiveness due to fluctuations in the US dollar and yen 
cross-rate (Bird and Rajan, 2002). Consistent with this, a recent study of 
exports by about 100 emerging economies to the US, Japan and Europe over 
the period 1983-92 concludes that the more flexible the exchange rate regime 
the better the export performance (Nilsson and Nilsson, 2000). However, 
countries pegging to a composite group of currencies do not appear to have 
experienced weaker economic performance than ones with independently 
floating regimes
3.  
Fourth, there is a widespread belief that a pegged regime induces 
increased policy discipline as fiscal profligacy will lead to a reserve depletion 
or burgeoning debt and an eventual currency collapse. However, the effects 
of unsound macro policies become evident immediately under flexible rates 
through currency and price level movements (i.e. depreciation-inflation spiral). 
Thus, flexible rates ought to instill greater fiscal restraint, as the costs of 
                                                 
2 The Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Tony Latter (2002), 
offers a stout defense of the Hong Kong US dollar peg. 
3 Their data is based on official IMF classification of exchange rate arrangements, i.e. they 
use de jure rather than de facto exchange rate regime.  9
macroeconomic policy transgressions have to be paid upfront. In other words, 
the key distinction between fixed and floating rates is in the intertemporal 
distribution of costs and benefits (Tornell and Velasco, 2000)
4.  
Fifth, banks tend to dominate the financial systems in the region, and 
the credit transmission channel plays a significant role in these countries. 
Calvo (1999) has shown that, ceteris paribus, the operation of this credit 
channel (which affects the IS curve directly and acts as a real shock) could tilt 
the balance in favor of greater exchange rate flexibility
5. 
While favoring relatively more flexible regimes, emerging economies in 
East Asia and elsewhere have continued to heavily manage their currencies 
despite being officially described as “floaters” (Rajan, 2002). Section 2 
discusses the rationale for this “fear of floating”, revisits the corners 
hypothesis and offers an alternative policy perspective. Section 3 explores the 
case for and operational mechanics behind an open inflation targeting regime 
which has increasingly been advocated for small and open economies in East 
Asia and elsewhere. This section stresses the importance of incorporating the 
exchange rate in open economy monetary policy rules. Section 4 examines 
the optimal policy responses by an optimizing monetary authority pursuing an 
open inflation target in the event of various shocks. The post-crisis East Asian 
monetary policy arrangements provide a suitable context for analyzing what 
part the exchange rate might play in the construction of an inflation-targeting 
regime. The final section attempts a reconciliation between the discussion of 
                                                 
4 Gavin and Perotti (1997) provide some empirical validity of this argument. After controlling 
for a host of other factors, they find that Latin American fiscal policies were more prudent 
under flexible rates than under floating ones. 
5 As Calvo (1999) notes, and as is easy to show, this conclusion may not remain valid in the 
event that a financial crisis (which in turn reduces the money multiplier) is more likely under a 
flexible regime compared to a fixed one.    10
analytics behind open economy inflation targeting and its implications for 
exchange rate design, on the one hand, and actual exchange rate ongoings in 
East Asia, on the other. 
  
2.  Revisiting the Flexible Corner 
2.1  Reasons for a “Fear of Floating” 
In view of the afore-mentioned potential benefits of flexible regimes, 
many observers have enthusiastically advocated the flexible option.  
Despite the foregoing reasons favoring a flexible exchange 
arrangement, countries with flexible regimes have experienced “excessive” 
volatility over the last few decades
6. It is admittedly difficult to define what 
exactly is meant by the term “excessive”. However, a reading of the relevant 
empirical literature reveals that evidence of excessive exchange rate 
variability comes in a number of forms (Bird and Rajan, 2001). For instance, a 
number of surveys of foreign exchange (forex) market participants clearly 
indicate that short term/high frequency exchange rate movements are caused 
by “speculative” or “trend-following” elements rather than underlying 
macroeconomic fundamentals. The problem of destabilizing speculation (as 
opposed to the Friedmanite speculators) - and consequent excessive or self-
aggravating exchange rate volatility - and dominance of fads and bubbles 
appears to  be aggravated in emerging economies, making a flexible regime 
especially unviable/unsuitable to them. This is particularly so since thin 
markets - which exist in emerging economies - imply that a few transactions 
can lead to extreme currency fluctuations.    11
Even if it were accepted that flexible exchange rates often appear to 
gyrate erratically – they exhibit far greater volatility than would be warranted 
by the underlying fundamentals, why might such excessive volatility be of 
concern? Recent studies
  have provided evidence of a negative impact of 
exchange rate volatility/uncertainty on investment (Corbo and Cox, 1995 and 
Huizinga, 1994). To the extent that investment has a significant positive
 
impact
  on economic growth, declining investment will have an enduring 
adverse impact on the quantity of real resources. Even in the absence of a 
negative effect on the level of investment, exchange rate variability may have 
an adverse influence over the composition of
 production and investment since 
decisions
  could be based on disequilibrium prices, particularly as flexible 
arrangements have frequently been associated with currency misalignments. 
It has often been argued that firms and other agents involved in 
international transactions can buy cover to hedge themselves against 
exchange rate movements. However, in addition to the costs involved with 
such operations, perfect hedges may be extremely difficult to create 
technically (given acute revenue-cost uncertainties) (Adler, 1994). Indeed, 
even if effective hedges could be created, they would entail non-negligible 
transaction costs, thus diverting scarce resources from “real” economic 
activity. This is especially true in the case of emerging economies where
 
rudimentary capital markets have necessitated using cross-hedging 
techniques (rather than direct hedging), which invariably are far costlier. 
Wei (1999) provides some important empirical evidence which 
suggests that exchange rate volatility has had a detrimental effect on trade 
                                                                                                                                            
6 Of course, almost no country has maintained a completely free (or pure) float, the authorities  12
between pairs of countries to a much larger extent than suggested by 
previous studies. More generally, in a comprehensive survey of the literature 
on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade flows, McKenzie (1999) 
concludes that the recent empirical studies have had “greater success in 
deriving a statistically significant relationship between volatility and trade” 
(p.100). Calvo and Reinhart (2000a) review a more limited set of such studies 
and draw a similar conclusion. Another recent set of empirics by Andrew Rose 
based on gravity models using both cross-sectional and time series data 
suggests institutionally fixed exchange regimes (i.e. common currency, 
currency boards or dollarization) stimulates trade, which in turn boosts income 
(see Frankel and Rose, 2002, Glick and Rose, 2002 and Rose, 2000). As is 
common knowledge, proponents of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
have used such an argument extensively in support of a single regional 
currency. In an important study, Bénassy-Quéré (1999) shows that exchange 
rate volatility could have a detrimental impact on FDI, comparable to the 
distortions created by currency misalignments.  
The high import content of emerging market’s output implies that pass-
through of exchange rate variations to domestic prices cannot be ignored 
(Baqueiro, et al., 2002). 
  Unlike industrial countries, many emerging economies are unable to 
borrow overseas in their domestic currencies, leading to an accumulation of 
foreign currency debt liabilities that are primarily dollar denominated and 
unhedged (i.e. “liability dollarization”)
7. In the presence of a degree of liability 
                                                                                                                                            
intervening intermittently to smooth market fluctuations. In other words “dirty floats” - i.e. forex 
interventions without commitment to defend any specific parity - have been the norm.  
7 This is commonly referred to as the “original sin” hypothesis, a term attributed to Hausmann 
(1999) and Hausmann et al. (2000).   13
dollarization, exchange rate fluctuations could alter the net worth of 
corporates and financial institutions with consequent real sector dislocations 
(so-called “balance sheet” effects). In addition, with a flexible regime, 
households, fearing the cost of currency fluctuations on their individual net 
worths, may shy away from holding domestic financial assets (asset 
denominated in domestic currencies), or from doing so within the domestic 
financial system, hence hindering the development of domestic financial 
markets. 
  Recent empirical evidence casts doubt on the extent to which floating 
regimes in emerging economies provide insulation from external shocks (see 
Frankel et al., 2000a and Hausmann et al., 2000). This has been attributed to 
the monetary authority choosing to use their exchange rate flexibility very 
sparingly. Many emerging economies appear to be plagued by an acute “fear 
of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000b) in the sense that they give continued 
priority to a high degree of exchange rate stability in emerging economies. In 
the final analysis, many policy makers in East Asia would probably concur with 
Williamson’s (2002) conclusion about a floating regime: 
(It) is not the option I would recommend, because of my doubts 
as to whether.. (such).a regime…is consistent with the restoration 
of the sustained high rates of growth that were experienced by 
East Asia before the crisis (p.1). 
 
 
2.2      The Impossible Trilogy Revisited 
The discussion thus far leads one in the direction of rejecting the 
“hollowing out hypothesis” or corners solution to exchange rate regimes. This 
hypothesis seems to draw analytical support from the “Impossible Trilogy”
8. 
                                                 
8 Also referred to as “Impossible Trinity”.  14
Simply put, this states that a country cannot simultaneously conduct 
independent monetary policy and pursue a fixed exchange regime if it wants 
to remain completely open to international capital flows. From an analytical 
perspective, Frankel (1999) has provided us with the timely reminder that the 
Impossible Trilogy does not on its own imply that in an increasingly globalized 
world economy an intermediate regime is unviable or that countries will be 
compelled to abandon the middle ground. In fact, there is a growing body of 
opinion that recognizes the potential usefulness of restraints on financial flows 
as a financial safeguard; there is no longer an ideological belief in the benefits 
of a completely open capital account
9. Once this is accepted, the analytical 
basis in support of the corners hypothesis weakens substantially; neither 
corner appears to work all that well for emerging economies.  
Willett (2002) too strongly questions whether countries really face such 
stark choices in their choice of exchange regimes. As he notes: 
The theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) yields a well-
established list of..criteria that affect the costs and benefits of 
adopting fixed versus flexible exchange rates. The application of 
a sensible range of parameter values to these criteria suggests 
that many…countries are not good candidates for either 
genuinely fixed exchange rates where domestic monetary policy 
is fully determined by developments in the balance of payments 
or for completely flexible exchange rates where no weight is 




Similarly, Fischer (2001) has acknowledged that there are many 
instances where intermediate regimes might well be “more appropriate” than 
corner solutions. He notes that the supposed bipolar view of exchange rates 
ought to be presented as a choice between a hard peg versus a “more flexible 
                                                 
9While empirical evidence regarding the benefits from capital account liberalization is unclear, 
risks of premature of ill-timed liberalization are unequivocal (Arteta et al., 2001 and Rajan, 
2002b).  15
regime” rather than a flexible exchange rate regime per se. The latter option 
implies the absence of any explicit exchange rate target, i.e. intervention 
should not be framed primarily in terms of defending a particular exchange 
rate target. Thus, when it comes to the choice of appropriate exchange rate 
regime, all that can really be said is that there exists a broad spectrum of 
choices. It is not a black-or-white issue; shades of gray abound.  
Design of an appropriate exchange rate arrangement cannot be done 
in isolation. It must be seen as part of a coherent macroeconomic strategy. No 
exchange rate regime will deliver stability if domestic macroeconomic policy is 
unsound, with large fiscal deficits, rapid monetary growth and inflation. 
Pegged exchange rates will become overvalued and reserves will fall, while 
flexible exchange rates will depreciate and may result in crises just as much 
as pegged regimes. Exchange rate policy in emerging economies may need 
to have a more limited objective. Rather than focusing on disciplining 
domestic macroeconomic policy and labor markets, perhaps the exchange 
rate regime should be designed in the first instance to minimize exposure to 
the third currency phenomenon (Bird and Rajan, 2002), where the problem for 
emerging economies arises from fluctuations in the values of the currencies of 
their major trading partners against one another.  
In the absence of strong capital controls, currency intervention ought 
not be framed as a specific target for the exchange rate. Such targets 
inevitably tempt speculators by offering them the infamous one-way option. 
Thus, exchange rate and monetary policy strategies must involve a “fairly 
high” element of flexibility rather than a single-minded defense of a particular 
                                                                                                                                            
10 Frankel (1999) and Kenen (2000) make similar points.  16
rate. This might best be achieved by a variant on sliding parities and wider 
bands around an appropriately weighted currency basket, the extent of which 
varying across the countries depending on individual circumstances and 
policy preferences -- a so-termed band-basket-or-crawl or BBC or a “flexible” 
inflation target. The latter involves gradual adjustment to an inflation target 
along with a positive weight on the exchange rate (in addition to inflation and 
output). While the topic of currency basket arrangements for East Asia has 
been extensively dealt with elsewhere (for instance, see Bird and Rajan, 
2002, Rajan, 2000a, Rajan, 2003 and Williamson, 1999b, 2001, 2002
), the 
remainder of this paper explores key aspects of open inflation targeting in 
general and particularly as they relate to East Asia. 
 
 
3.  Open Economy Inflation Targeting: Role of the Exchange Rate  
 
3.1  Monetary Policy Rules in Open Economies 
 
  Buoyed by the apparent success of inflation targeting in industrial 
countries in the early 1990s, it has been advocated by the IMF and others as 
a viable policy option for emerging economies in East Asian and elsewhere. 
What exactly is inflation targeting? While definitions do vary in the literature, 
Eichengreen (2001b) defines inflation targeting as follows: 
(A) monetary policy operating strategy with four elements: an 
institutionalized commitment to price stability as the primary goal 
of monetary policy; mechanisms rendering the central bank 
accountable for attaining its monetary policy goals; the public 
announcement of targets for inflation; and a policy of 
communicating to the public and the markets the rationale for 
the decisions taken by the central bank (p.4). 
 
    As suggested by the preceding quote, inflation targeting is conducted 
in conjunction with a monetary policy rule (MPR). In general terms, the MPR  17
is one element of a strategy employed by the monetary authority as part of its 
overall monetary policy. The MPR specifies how the instrument of monetary 
policy is to be changed given the characteristics of the macroeconomy and 
the policy objectives of the monetary authority. The MPR implicitly assumes 
that the instrument of monetary policy will always react strongly to inflation (or 
some forecast of future inflation). MPRs and inflation targets do not 
necessarily mean the same thing. The two are different elements of a general 
monetary policy strategy. The MPR provides a guide to the policymaker as to 
how to manipulate the instrument of monetary policy; the inflation target 
simply makes a statement of what the instrument is being ultimately used for. 
According to Taylor (2000b): 
There is an interesting symbiotic relationship between inflation 
targeting and monetary policy rules..A monetary policy rule is 
nothing more than a contingency plan that describes as 
precisely as possible the circumstances in which a central bank 
changes the instruments of monetary policy (p.2)
 11. 
 
The instrument of monetary policy is most commonly an interest rate, 
usually a short-term cash rate or repo rate, though other policy instruments 
could also be used. For instance, McCallum (1999) has suggested the use of 
the growth rate of money. As will be discussed later, in some cases, a 
weighted average for the interest rate and exchange rate (so-called Monetary 
Conditions Index) might be used (also see fns 13 and 15). 
For much of this last decade, the literature on MPRs and Inflation 
Targeting has developed in a closed economy context (Ball, 1997 and 
                                                 
11 Closely related to the distinction between MPRs and IT is the need to distinguish between 
two types of policy rules, viz. an instrument rule and a target rule (Svensson, 1997, 2002). A 
target rule focuses policymaker’s attention on the stated target and is very model-dependent. 
The instrument rule is not directly related a specific objective and offers the flexibility to be 
applied across models (Batini and Haldane 1999). There are many examples of target rules  18
Svensson, 1997). It is only recently, when inflation targeting has been 
suggested as a serious policy option for small and open emerging economies, 
that research has begun to focus on rules in open economy models and 
consequently, the role of the exchange rate. For instance, Fischer (2001) 
notes that “in most countries, even those with floating exchange rate regimes, 
monetary policy is likely to respond to some extent to movements in the 
exchange rate” (p.13).  
 
a)  Stylized Macro Model   
In order to clarify the role of the exchange rate in the setting of the 
MPR, consider a stylized dynamic model of a small open economy which can 
be represented by a usual output function or an open economy IS curve (eq. 
1), an open economy, accelerationist Phillips curve equation (eq. 2), and an 
uncovered interest parity condition (in general form) with the expected 
depreciation of the exchange rate normalized to zero (eq. 3): 
 
yt = f [rt-1, yt-1, et-1, εεεε t]         ( 1 )  
 
ππππ t = g [ππππ t-1, yt-1, et-1, ηηηη t]        ( 2 )
12 
 
et = h [rt, r
*




t and rpt is the foreign interest rate and a risk premium, respectively 
and f (.), g (.) and h (.) and general functional forms – although they could just 
as easily be written as linear functions as commonly presented in this 
literature. Assume ε t and η t are random shocks not known to the policy maker.  
                                                                                                                                            
(for instance, see Svensson, 1997, 2000), the most widely cited being the Taylor Rule (Taylor 
1993). 
12 Eq. 4 is sometimes specified as:  π t = g [π t-1, yt-1, (et-1- et-2), η t].  19
  A key result of the model is that monetary policy affects inflation 
directly through the price effects of currency movements as well as indirectly 
via output (which in turn is impacted by both interest and exchange rate 
changes). The direct effect takes place with a one period lag, while the lag 
structure of the stylized economy implies that indirect effects on inflation via 
output occur after two periods
13. The more open the economy the stronger the 
effects of import prices on domestic inflation, i.e. a larger coefficient on the et-1 
in eq. 2 and an increased effect of the exchange rate on goods demand in eq. 
3. 
 
b)  Interest Rate Rule 
Assuming the existence of a quadratic loss function (see Annex 1), it 
can be shown that optimal monetary policy rule is give by a variant of the 
Taylor Rule (a la Taylor, 1993, 2002a,b,c):  
 
rt = ayt + bππππ t + c1et + c2et-1       ( 4 )  
 
where et and et-1 refer to the foreign currency price of domestic currency in 
time period t and t-1, respectively; π t is the inflation rate expressed as 
deviation from the target (π *); yt is real GDP in time t; and rt is the real interest 
rate at time t, both variables expressed as deviations from their respective 
steady state/equilibrium mean values
14.  
  The relevant question is what value should the c parameters hold, if 
any. The original Taylor rule for a large and relatively closed economy like the 
                                                 
13 Direct effect: rt  --> e t  --> π t+1 . Indirect effect: rt  --> e t  --> yt+1 ! π t+2 .  20
US is one where a, b  > 0 and c1 = c2 = 0. For a small and open economy, the 
exchange rate should enter the MPR with a non-zero coefficient. In particular, 
c1 must be less than zero and c2 must be greater than or equal to zero. This is 
so as an appreciation (increase) of the domestic currency necessitates a 
relaxation of monetary policy, i.e. currency appreciation tends to be 
deflationary. A positive c2 represents a partial adjustment. Recent work using 
simulations on different types of macro models find values for c1  range 
between -0.45 and  -0.25, while those for c2 range between 0.15 and 0.45 
(Table 1).  
There have been some recent contributions examining the effect of the 
exchange rate on interest rate rules. Clarida et al. (1998) estimated a set of 
MPRs for two sets of countries. The first set is Germany, Japan and the US 
while the UK, France and Italy form the second set. The latter set constitutes 
relatively smaller and more open economies. It turns out that the policy rules 
for the second set reacted relatively more strongly to the exchange rate (in 
this case, the DM) and to German monetary policy than did the first set. This 
is an indication that more open economies may feel the need to smooth the 
volatility of their exchange rates. There have been few if any studies to date 
that have looked at policy rules for East Asian countries; this is an important 
area for future research
15. 
                                                                                                                                            
14 The MPR is sometimes modified to include an interest rate smoothing process 
which describes the gradual adjustment of the interest rate to its target by the 
monetary authority. 
15 The foregoing discussion skips over a host of important issues that need to be considered 
by an inflation targeting monetary authority. One, what type of exchange rate should be 
included in the policy rule. Strictly speaking, eq. 1 requires the inclusion of an export-weighted 
real exchange rate while eq. 2 requires the use of import weighted nominal exchange rates. 
Two, an alternative to an inflation target would be a price target, i.e. specifying the price level, 
as opposed to the inflation rate. Apart from the fact that price level targeting will inevitably 
lead to sharper gyrations in output and gives rise to more volatile short-horizon prices (but 
more stable longer horizon ones), most central banks in practice pursue an inflation as  21
 
c)  Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) 
Another way in which the exchange rate might be included in a rule is 
via a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)  (Ball, 1999 and Svensson, 2000). The 
MCI takes the following form: 
  
wrt + (1-w)et = ayt + bππππ t       ( 5 )  
 
In other words, the MCI is merely a weighted combination of movements in 
the interest rate and the exchange rate.  
The central idea behind a MCI is that the ratio between the exchange 
rate and the interest rate remains constant. This ensures, for example, that 
tight monetary policy is reflected in both the money and foreign exchange 
markets. This is done either by manipulating both of the instruments 
separately or by changing one instrument - usually the interest rate - which in 
turn will induce changes in the other. Ball (1999), for instance, suggests that 
the underlying instrument of the MCI is the interest rate. As such, the constant 
ratio between the interest rate and the exchange rate is maintained by shifting 
the interest rate which will then effect a change in the exchange rate. For this 
to work effectively there must exist a stable relationship between the two 
                                                                                                                                            
opposed to a price level target. Three, some have suggested the need to include asset prices 
other than the exchange rate – real estate and equity prices, for instance. This literature is in 
its infancy with no unambiguous conclusion (for instance, see Bordo and Jeanne, 2002 and 
Cecchetti, et al., 2000 and 2002). Some of the general issues of clarity of objectives and 
transparency versus the benefits of discretion outlined in Section 5 are of particular relevance 
to this debate.   22
policy instruments
16. This in turn requires the satisfaction of arbitrage price 
conditions (such as the UIP - eq. 3 above)
17.   
Speaking about Thailand which has an MCI operational target, 
Hataiseree (1998) notes: 
The..MCI..can be used to compare the degree of importance 
between interest rate and the exchange rate in influencing the 
future inflation rate. Empirically, it was found that the MCI ratio 
for Thailand takes the value of 3.3 : 1. This ratio implies that 
when the baht is expected to depreciate at an average rate of 
3.3% in any particular time, ceteris paribus, the interest rate 
needs to be raised by an average of 1% in order to prevent the 
expectation of the bath depreciation from effecting the 
forecasting of the future inflation rate (p.27). 
 
While an important virtue of the MCI is its transparency and verifiability 
a la Frankel et al. (2000b), as will be discussed in the next section, a major 
drawback with its use as an operational target is that it straitjackets monetary 
policy in some instances to the detriment of output and employment. 
Considerable care therefore needs to be taken in the implementation of the 
MCI as an operational target. There is a growing consensus that, at best, the 
MCI offers a useful composite indicator of overall macroeconomic and 
financial conditions in a small and open economy (Hataiseree, 1998 and 
Siklos, 2000).  
 
 
3.2  Exploring the Loss Function of the Monetary Authority in an Open 
Economy 
 
                                                 
16 A second criterion for the working of an MCI is the absence of sterilization of the monetary 
effects of policy as this will undo the working of the MCI. 
17 Fung (2001) uses a VAR model to estimate the effects of a MCI for a sample of East Asian 
countries. Another option might be to employ the exchange rate as the sole policy instrument. 
The monetary authority can use the management of it’s foreign currency reserves to allow the 
currency to react to, say, inflation and output, in the same as the Taylor rule uses the 
domestic interest rate (see McCauley, 2001).   23
The discussion thus far has focused on the use of the exchange rate 
as part of the instrument rule, or in some cases as the instrument itself. But 
what happens if the monetary authority is also concerned about exchange 
rate volatility as a policy objective in and of itself?  
If the desire for exchange rate stability stems from its potential 
deleterious effects on growth, arguably this implies that eq. 1 above is mis-
specified, with an additional term for exchange rate variability needing to be 
added on to the right hand side of eq. 1. If this is done, there ought not to be 
any reason to be concerned about exchange rate stability for its own sake (i.e. 
there is no reason that it should enter the monetary authority’s loss function 
independently over and above inflation and output). Thus, for the exchange 
rate to directly enter the monetary authority’s loss function - i.e. for the 
monetary authority to exhibit a genuine “fear of floating” - it must either: (a) be 
valued for its own sake in addition to its impact on inflation and output; or (b) if 
valued because of its impact on inflation and output, for some reason, its 
impact on the macroeconomy cannot be adequately captured in the specified 
macro model (eqs. 1 and 2).  
Consider a generalized, intertemporal loss function of the monetary 
authority which is stated in quadratic form
18: 
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where  δ  is a discount factor representing the central bank’s rate of time 
preference,  α ,  λ ,  ν ,  µ ,  κ   are policy parameters that relate to inflation (π ),  24
output (y), interest rate (i) smoothing, nominal income and the exchange rate 
(e) respectively. The objectives of the monetary authority are principally 
inflation and output and also include an interest rate smoothing term
19.  
On the basis of eq. 6 above, we can identify a number of possible 
targeting scenarios. These are summarized in Table 2
20. 
Assume the simplest case where all coefficients in eq. 6 other than α  
are set to zero. This implies that the specified monetary authority focuses 
solely on the inflation objective (ignoring the interest smoothing objective)
21. 
However, even with strict inflation targeting there is still a positive coefficient 
on the output gap in the MPR (eq. 4) in view of the importance of the output 
gap in impacting future inflation. The inclusion of the output variable 
effectively implies that the monetary authority pursues a “soft” or “flexible” 
inflation target, whereby the aim is not to hit the target inflation as soon as 
possible, but rather, do so over time (Debelle, 2001 and Mishkin, 2002). 
Similarly, even if the exchange rate is not in the loss function, the exchange 
rate will enter the MPR with a positive coefficient in view of its information 
content about current and future inflation (and output). We elaborate on this 
point in Section 5. 
                                                                                                                                            
18 The quadratic structure of the loss function - which is used because of its mathematical 
tractability - along with the evolution of the state (eqs. 1 to 3) in turn gives rise to the linear 
MPR (eq. 4). 
19 We include the interest smoothing term in the loss function as in practice central banks tend 
are keen on prevent sharp fluctuations in the instrument (also fn 12 and Lowe and Ellis, 1997 
and Sack and Weiland, 1999). Indeed, the same argument would probably hold in the case of 
the inclusion of the exchange rate, especially if the instrument is the MCI. Nonetheless, in the 
literature (as well as policy), while the exchange rate issue is viewed as being controversial, 
the interest smoothing one is not. It bears noting that even those who strongly advocate that 
the inflation targeting monetary authority should react to asset prices in the course of policy 
making, are clear that asset prices ought not to be included in the objective function. See 
Cecchetti et al. (2002) for a clear statement on this.   
20 Also see Debelle (2001) and Leitemo et al. (2002). 
21 Mervyn King (1996) terms such an optimizing monetary authority an “inflation nutter”.  25
If all the coefficients in the loss function including the exchange rate 
policy parameter (Κ) are positive, this represents an attempt by the monetary 
authority to manage the movements in its exchange rate (as well as output). 
When the loss function is minimized subject to a macro model as the 
constraints (eqs. 1 - 3), the resulting monetary policy rule (eq. 4) will include 
an exchange rate policy parameter in the same way as α  is for inflation or λ  is 
for output.  
 
4.  Responding to Shocks in an Open Economy Inflation Targeting 
Regime 
 
An important issue that arises in the context of managing exchange 
rates in an inflation targeting regime pertains to shocks. How should the 
monetary authority respond to various shocks?
22  
   Consider three general shocks, a positive domestic demand shock, a 
foreign financial shock like a risk premium shock and a terms of trade shock.  
A positive demand shock affects yt in eq. 1 directly, which in turn 
threatens to impact future inflation (from eq. 2). The policy response in this 
case is to increase rt to the extent given by the parameter, a in the rule in eq. 
4 which in turn leads to the appreciation of the currency (eq. 3). However, in 
the next period, if the MPR parameter c1, has a negative value (see Table 1), 
part of the interest rate increase will be reversed in response to the 
appreciation. Clearly, in the case of a domestic demand shock, there is a 
trade-off between the goal of maintaining a stable exchange rate, on the one 
hand, and that of keeping inflation under tabs, on the other. One way of 
minimizing this trade-off would be ensure that the inflation objective is 
                                                 
22 This section draws heavily on Ball (1999), Eichengreen (2001b) as well as Siklos (2000).  26
reached over time rather than as soon as possible. We return to this issue in 
Section 5.  
Next consider the case of a negative financial shock such as a rise in 
the risk premium (rpt) – a pure portfolio disturbance shock. A risk premium 
shock causes a reduction in the exchange rate today with consequent 
inflationary effects via pass through (eq. 2). Over time, the currency 
depreciation ought to have positive output effects via the competitiveness 
channel, which in turn will have inflationary effects via the Phillips curve 
relation (eq. 1). In this case, in view of the unambiguous inflationary effects of 
this shock, the inflation targeting monetary authority will raise interest rates. 
While this monetary policy response is optimal from an inflation perspective, it 
may be mistakenly interpreted as a “fear of floating” (i.e. exchange rate 
stability is viewed as an end in itself). Also, note here that the optimal interest 
rate policy response is not inconsistent with that suggested by an MCI as an 
operational target
23.  
However, foreign shocks are not only of the financial variety. As noted 
by Eichengreen (2001b), a MPR is harder to use where the foreign shock 
involves a terms of trade/external demand shock. Consider a negative terms 
of trade shock. In this case, an interest rate hike would merely exacerbate the 
decline in aggregate demand. Insofar as the inflationary effects via the 
aggregate demand channel outweighs the direct price or passthrough effect, 
the appropriate interest rates response would be to lower interest rates. While 
this would be at odds with the policy that may be advocated by a “fear of 
floating” monetary authority, it is consistent with received wisdom which  27
suggests that the more variable the terms of trade, the more flexible ought to 
be the exchange rate regime. Note also that the policy recommendation would 
be at odds with a MCI as an operational target which would mandate a rise in 
interest rate to ensure that ratio between the exchange rate and interest rate 
remains more or less constant, though this would magnify the output loss 
(Ball, 1999). 
The oft-noted example in this regard is that of New Zealand, which 
stringently adhered to the MCI as an operational target until 1998. The 
response of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to the negative export 
demand shock following the East Asian crisis was to raise interest rates to 
prop up the currency as required by the MCI. This in turn had sharp 
deflationary effects. Of course, the above analysis is rather oversimplified. As 
noted by Ball (1999), in actuality New Zealand was faced with a double 
whammy of a terms of trade shock as well as a financial one, the latter 
involving sharp capital outflows from the entire region. If one made the 
assumption that the financial shock outweighed the terms of trade shock, this 
would suggest that the policy bias ought to be towards an interest rate hike 
(which is what an MCI target would recommend). This is the policy that the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) pursued. To their credit, once the 
authorities realized that the net effects of the shocks and the initial policy 
response threatened to be sharply deflationary, the interest rate hike was 
reversed somewhat, though the easing was a case of being too little, too late 
(Chart 1b). The RBNZ has since forsaken the use of the MCI as an 
                                                                                                                                            
23 Indeed, use of the MCI as an operational target may be interpreted as the monetary 
authority demonstrating a degree of fear of floating.  28
operational target but continue to use it as an indicator of monetary conditions 
(Siklos, 2000). 
As noted, an important characteristic of a number of emerging 
economies in East Asia and elsewhere is the extent to which their liabilities 
are dollarized. Does incorporation of this factor in any way change the 
preceding policy recommendations? In the case of a financial shock, insofar 
as the exchange rate depreciation implies a contractionary effect on 
aggregate demand, the initial policy recommendation of an interest rate hike 
not only keeps inflation down, it stabilizes the exchange rate and prevents an 
output contraction. Consider a terms of trade shock. In this case, as long as 
the balance sheet effect does not outweigh the competitiveness effect, the 
original policy recommendation of an interest rate hike goes through. If, 
however, the former exceeds the latter, an interest rate reduction will 
exacerbate the deflationary effects, thus suggesting the need for an interest 
rate hike. Eichengreen (2001b) notes of this case: 
(A) negative shock that reduces export demand and depresses 
output must be offset in the new long-run equilibrium by an 
appreciated exchange rate, not a depreciated one. In this 
peculiar world, overvaluation is good for output because its 
favorable financial effects dominate its adverse competitiveness 
effects. It can be reasonably objected that this is 
unrealistic…But relaxing this assumption means we are back in 
a world not just where the authorities allow the exchange rate to 
adjust to a new lower level following an adverse ..(terms of 
trade).. shock but also where they do not jack up interest rates 
to significantly slow its movement. In other words, we are back 
in the world where they display “fear of fixing” rather than “fear 
of floating”. A possible reconciliation is that when the exchange 
rate depreciates by a large amount, the adverse balance-sheet 
effects dominate, but when it depreciates by a small amount, the 
favorable competitiveness effects dominate. Large depreciations 
cause severe financial distress because they confront banks 
and firms with asset prices for which they are unprepared, while 
doing little to enhance competitiveness because of the speed 
with which they are passed through into inflation. For small  29
depreciations, the balance of effects is the opposite; small 
depreciations are more likely therefore to satisfy the conditions 
for an expansionary devaluation (pp.27-9)
24. 
 
  Some support of this asymmetry between large and small exchange 
rate shocks is provided by Lahiri and Vegh (2001) and Moron and Winkelreid 
(2003). They find that in the case of country susceptible to balance sheet 
effects (i.e. a “financially vulnerable country” as they put it) a case can be 
made for a non-linear MPR. The non-linearity arises from the fact that the 
authority should defend the exchange rate in the “turbulent times” but allows 
the exchange rate to float in tranquil times.  
The shocks that were examined above are very stylized and were 
assumed to be permanent. If they were transitory, the policy responses above 
would broadly remain intact though the interest rate change would be less 
marked, the rationale being that both the price and output effects tend to have 
inertial components (see eqs. 1 and 2) and therefore tend to be longer-lasting  
While the preceding discussion is somewhat simplified, it does show 
that monetary policy under an inflation targeting regime may be flexible 
enough to allow the exchange rate to be addressed on the basis of 
responding to particular shocks. Just like inflation and output, if the exchange 
rate is in the rule, the monetary authority will react to it when it has moved as 
a result of a shock. In this case the exchange rate becomes an objective of 
policy not for its own sake but because of its impact in inflation directly or 
indirectly. This is not a genuine fear of floating. For a monetary authority to 
exhibit fear of floating, the exchange rate term must enter the monetary 
authority’s objective function directly. 
                                                 
24 See Krugman (1999) for an elaboration of these thresholds effects of devaluation in  30
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
Since the East Asian financial debacle of 1997-98, a handful of 
countries in the region -- Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines -- 
have instituted monetary policy arrangements fashioned around an inflation 
objective. Each of these countries has passed legal and institutional 
legislations supporting their respective inflation targeting arrangements
25. 
These legislations so passed provide for many facets of the new monetary 
policy regime including the appointment of key personnel and their tenure 
(five year terms in Korea and four years each in Indonesia and Thailand
), the 
independence and autonomy of the monetary authority, the stated objectives 
of monetary policy and the responsibilities and accountability with respect to 
the achievement of those objectives. For example, Article 3 of the Bank of 
Korea Act states that “monetary and credit policies of the Bank of Korea shall 
be formulated neutrally and implemented autonomously and [its] 
independence …shall be respected”. Article 6 provides for the annual setting 
of the price stability target ( www.bok.or.kr
  ). The new Bank Indonesia law 
states that the single objective of monetary policy is to “pursue and maintain 
stability of the value of the rupiah” (www.bi.go.id )
26. 
How have these new inflation targeters performed since implementing 
an inflation targeting regime? The inflation performances of these new 
                                                                                                                                            
emerging economies. 
25 The revised Bank of Korea Act in December 1997 (and revised in April 1998), the new bank 
of Indonesia Act in May 1999 and the Bank of Thailand Act of May 2000, respectively. 
26 Alamsyah et al. (2001) note of the new Bank Indonesia pronouncement: 
The value of the rupiah” could refer to its value in terms of another currency 
unit – presumably the US dollar, but perhaps some other currency..The 
alternative interpretation is that it refers to the value of the goods and 
services the rupiah can buy. This interpretation implies that the objective is  31
regimes against their stated targets are provided in Table 3
27. Thus far the 
performances have been reasonably good, with Thailand, Korea and the 
Philippines for the most part being within target. Indonesia has struggled to 
keep its inflation within its target range while Korea also exceeded its target 
for 2001 and 2002. In contrast to the de jure exchange rate classifications, 
observations of the de facto regimes – the exchange rate arrangements that 
countries are actually implementing – seem to suggest a reversion to US 
dollar pegs, albeit ones not as tightly as before the crisis (Charts 1c-g). 
Several studies have argued this to be the case (for instance, see Baig, 2001, 
Calvo and Reinhart, 2002 and McKinnon, 2000).  
Is the relative fixity of regional currencies really a reversion to ad hoc 
managed floating regimes as many have argued, or is it a consequence of 
“flexible” or “soft” inflation target (Debelle, 2001)? The latter involves 
maintaining a fairly broad inflation target band that needs to be hit gradually 
over time, such as over the course of a business cycle, rather than as soon as 
possible. This allows for short-term over or under shooting of the target. 
Choosing a longer target horizon effectively involves putting more weight on 
other objectives like output and the exchange rate stability in the objective 
function of the monetary authority, i.e. they enter the loss function of the 
monetary authority directly along with inflation
28. This way, the monetary 
                                                                                                                                            
the maintenance of domestic price stability, and it is this interpretation that 
has emerged as the operational one (p.314). 
27 Each of these monetary authorities defines inflation a little differently to each other. 
Indonesia excludes the effect of government prices and incomes policy. Korea uses CPI 
excluding petrol and some farm products. Thailand excludes raw food and energy prices. See 
McCauley (2001). See fn 28. 
28 Yet another way of thinking about this would be to say that the optimizing monetary 
authority places relatively greater weight on future inflation.  32
authority’s performance is judged by the average inflation rate over the 
business cycle rather than at each year.  
Ball (1999) suggests that in open economies, the monetary authorities 
ought to target “long-run inflation” which is a measure of inflation that is 
adjusted to transitory effects of exchange-rate movements. According to him, 
the reason to do so would be to ensure that policymakers do not react too 
strongly to exchange rate changes which may in turn have sharp output 
effects. While conceptually there may be little difference between this 
suggestion and targeting inflation over the business cycle, arguably the former 
is less easily and effectively communicatable to the public which may focus 
only on headline inflation
29.  
As long as the country’s inflation outlook remains consistent with the 
medium term inflation target range (i.e. the policy reference period), the 
monetary authority have space to use its judgement to judiciously react to 
other goals such as output, exchange rate or even asset price stability 
(though it would be imprudent to try and control too many elements in the 
economy). However, there needs to be a clear lexicographic ordering in favor 
of the inflation goal, such that if the inflation target is threatened at anytime, 
there is a commitment by the monetary authority to relinquish all other goals 
in order to meet the inflation target. The more flexible the inflation target (i.e. 
larger the band and longer the policy horizon) the greater the degree of 
discretion that can be used by the monetary authority to meet other objectives 
and respond effectively to various shocks in the interim, though this would be 
                                                 
29 It is for the same reason that suggestions that the monetary authority explicitly target 
anything other than headline inflation (like CPI) probably ought to be eschewed. Many 
industrial countries target “core” inflation, i.e. overall price changes net of commodity prices.  33
at the expense of transparency and verifiability
30. In other words, multiplicity of 
objectives/flexibility in implementing the inflation target invariably complicates 
the communication strategy of the monetary authority’s monetary policy. As 
Mishkin (2002) notes:  
The KISS principle (“Keep It Simple Stupid”) suggests that 
monetary policy should be articulated in as simple way as 
possible. The beauty of inflation target regimes is that by 
focusing on one objective – inflation – communication is fairly 
straightforward.” (p.14). 
 
Apart from lack of clarity regarding the goal of monetary policy, there 
are a number of concerns with incorporating multiple variables in the loss 
function (i.e. multiple targeting).  
One, it is difficult to measure output gaps given the problems with 
measuring equilibrium output and exchange rate (Mishkin. 2002). Of course, 
one way to overcome this concern would be to target output and exchange 
rate variability as opposed to variation from equilibrium (Ades, 2002). In the 
case of the exchange rate objective this effectively implies the monetary 
authority focuses on the resource allocation costs of large exchange rate 
fluctuations as opposed to those due to currency misalignment
31. 
Two, when monetary authorities explain their monetary policy actions 
by referring to the need to ensure output or exchange rate stability, “the 
political debate about monetary policy is likely to focus on short-run issues” 
(Mishkin, 2002, p.11), be it job creation, exchange rate stability of even asset 
                                                 
30 One might call this the “Australian view” of inflation targeting. See Debelle (2001). 
31 A caveat is in order. Williamson (2001, 2002) has suggested that the monetary authority 
target a BBC with fairly wide bands, thus allowing for a degree of discretionary monetary 
policy to be implemented within the band. Also see Rajan (2002a). Willett (2002) makes the 
valid point that one could approach the design of exchange rate bands in an analogous 
manner to that of inflation targeting. Interestingly, the real effective exchange rates (REERs) 
of many East Asian countries appear relatively stable, leading one to wonder whether at least 
some of the regional  authorities might not be targeting a real currency basket a la  34
price stability. This in turn may “obscure the transparency of monetary policy 
and make it less likely that the public will support a monetary policy that 
focuses on long-run considerations” (Mishkin, 2002, p.14) and will worsen the 
output-inflation tradeoff.    
Three, in relation to the above, responding too heavily and frequently to 
currency movements in the short-term could risk transforming the flexible 
inflation target to a de facto soft currency peg which in turn tends to be crisis-
prone. This observation may be especially pertinent to some East Asian 
economies where there are concerns of a reversion to exchange-rate based 
monetary policy regime. For instance, an IMF report on exchange rate 
regimes has rightly cautioned that: 
There is an important danger…in slipping back into de facto 
pegging of exchange rates against the US dollar. While this may 
be sustainable for some considerable period, this may well 
eventually contribute to recreating the problems that led up to 
the Asian crisis.” (Mussa et al., 2000, p.59).  
 
The foregoing notwithstanding, the optimal monetary policy rules 
themselves can and do depend heavily on the foundation and structure of 
economic and financial systems of an individual country. Consequently, there 
is significant margin of error in the policy rules that are frequently written down 
in the form of a mechanical operational instruction (algebraic formula)
32, thus 
suggesting need for a degree of discretion in its implementation. Additionally, 
                                                                                                                                            
Singapore’s monitoring band arrangement (Rajan, 2002a and Rajan and Siregar, 2002, 
2003). This is a point requiring more in-depth exploration (also see fn 14).   35
some degree of flexibility is desirable given the uncertainty about the link 
between policy instruments (exchange rate and interest rate) and policy 
outcomes (inflation) as well as other types of uncertainty, including those 
inherent in forecasting inflation
33.  
Bernanke and Mishkin (1998) opine that inflation targeting “is a broad 
framework for policy, which allows the monetary authority ‘constrained 
discretion’, rather than as an ironclad policy rule in the Friedman sense” (p.1). 
While the exact balance between flexibility and rigidity will no doubt vary 
between countries (and possibly over time within a country), suffice it to note 
that (a) the less credible the monetary authority (i.e. weaker its inflation-
fighting track record); (b) the less its technical ability; (c) the lower its political 
independence; and (d) the lower the degree of liability dollarization, the more 
attractive would be a pre-commitment to hard inflation target (i.e. preference 
of a rule over discretion). Conversely, the more open the economy and the 
less ingrained are inflationary expectations in agents in the country and the 
less intense are the potential balance sheet effects of currency fluctuations, 
the greater the scope for discretion over strict inflation target rules. There are 
of course, all kinds of tradeoffs involved between the above categories – for 
instance, it is quite likely that countries where the central bank has limited 
credibility in the eyes of markets and a reputation of pursuing inconsistent 
monetary policies will also be the ones where liability dollarization is most 
pervasive.  
                                                                                                                                            
32 For instance, what are the factors that enter the monetary authority’s loss function?; is the 
loss function quadratic?; what is the true structural economic model? All of these will impact 
the final policy rule that is derived. 
33 Though, of course, the longer the policy horizon the less reliable are inflation forecasts.   36
Regardless of the extent of flexibility or discretion that is pursued, it is 
imperative that the monetary authority pursuing an inflation targeting regime 
communicate effectively to the public the lexicographic ordering of its 
objectives (with inflation taking precedence over all others over time) and the 
time frame over which the monetary authority is committed to returning 
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Actual versus Targeted Inflation Rates (in percent): 
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    3-5  5.9  3-5 12.5 3-5 10.3 9.0 
Thailand 
 









   * plus/minus half percentage point 
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Notes:  GDP is proxied by production of crude petroleum. (line 66AA IFS) 
  







































Notes:     GDP is proxied by Manufacturing Production (line 66EY IFS) 
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